Proxy Voting Report

Reporting Period: CY 2024

Summary

Total Meetings	75
Total Meetings Voted	75
Number of Resolutions	1122

Proposal Statistics

	Management Proposals	Shareholder Proposals	Total	Comments
With Management	1038	55	1093	
Against Management	18	1	19	17 relate to Compensation resolutions for Adobe, CME Group, eBay, FICO, Intuit, Johnson & Johnson, Nike, Oracle Corporation, PayPal Holdings, Walt Disney, Verisk Analytics and TKO. One management and one shareholder proposal related to Board election resolutions for Walt Disney.
Abstain	7	3	10	Five of the management proposals related to Board election proposals for Prada S.p.A. Two management proposals related to compensation (Kenvue Inc and Universal Music Group). We abstained on two shareholder resolutions relating to an independent Chair (Mondelez International and Colgate-Palmolive Co), and one shareholder resolution to eliminate supermajority voting requirements (Verisk Analytics).
Total	1063	59	1122	

Commentary

Votes against management have typically been in the low single-digit range. The main reason for this is that our long-term approach to investment generally leads us to be supportive of company management. Prior to reaching the point of voting against company management, we will try to influence management through our engagement activities. Our intention is to have open and constructive dialogue with management and board members, in order to broaden our knowledge of the company's strategy and operations and to ensure any concerns we might have are assuaged. Given we often build up large, long-term, stakes in the businesses in which we invest we find that management are open to (and very often encourage) engaging with Lindsell Train.

In most cases where we have voted against management it has been on matters relating to remuneration. Lindsell Train pays careful consideration to the compensation policies of the companies in which we invest. In assessing their compensation policies, we focus more on how incentives are structured rather than the actual quantum of compensation. In other words, we can be comfortable with large rewards provided that the incentives are aligned with shareholders' interests and our principles. Where we do not believe that a company's compensation policy is aligned with the long-term best interests of the shareholders, we will write to management to inform them of our intention to vote against such policies.



Voting Record by Category

Reporting Period: CY 2024

Management Proposals

	For	Against	Abstain	Total
Audit/Financials	122	0	0	122
Board Related	697	1	5*	703
Capital Management	88	0	0	88
Changes to Company Statutes	22	0	0	22
Compensation	92	17	2	111
M&A	2	0	0	2
Meeting Administration	4	0	0	4
Other	11	0	0	11
Total	1038	18	7	1063

^{*}Note: These five abstentions, related to our holding in Prada, were the result of an administrative restriction on the Glass Lewis voting platform. We are supportive of the company's recommendations.

Shareholder Proposals

	For	Against	Abstain	Total
Compensation	0	7	0	7
Environment	0	5	0	5
Governance	1	9	3	13
Misc.	0	5	0	5
Social	0	29	0	29
Total	1	55	3	59

Appendix: Detailed Voting Disclosure 2024